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A VOICE FOR ONE, OR A VOICE 
FOR THE PEOPLE:  BALANCING 
PROSECUTORIAL SPEECH PROTECTIONS 
WITH COMMUNITY TRUST 
Immanuel Kim* 
 
Prosecutors, as representatives of the public in the criminal justice system, 
are the sole advocates for “the People” in a criminal case.  Thus, prosecutors 
are expected to maintain a particular level of integrity that would ensure a 
fair and just representation of the People.  Despite this expectation, the wide 
discretionary authority prosecutors hold makes it virtually impossible to 
regulate their conduct.  Furthermore, the First Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution protects many expressions of viewpoints, and such protections 
extend—albeit to a limited degree—to prosecutors, thereby giving them even 
more discretion in how they decide to handle their own cases.  Nonetheless, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has not interpreted the First Amendment to protect 
prosecutors whose words evidently contravene the functions of the 
prosecutor’s office.  Rather, a prosecutor may be terminated if the office finds 
that the prosecutor’s speech undermines the office’s interests.  What the law 
does not address, however, is the extent to which the First Amendment 
protects prosecutors whose unfavorable viewpoints do not affect their 
individual performance within the workplace but nonetheless detract from 
the community’s trust in the prosecutor’s office.  This Note examines the state 
of the First Amendment as it applies to prosecutors within the scope of their 
employment and utilizes the underlying principles to expand the discussion 
to prosecutorial speech beyond the scope of their employment.  Ultimately, 
this Note proposes that prosecutorial speech should be regulated not only by 
the effect the speech has on the office’s functions but also by the adverse 
effect the speech has on the community’s trust in the prosecutor and the office 
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INTRODUCTION 
Prosecutors are public officials who represent the residents of a community 
(“the People”) and their interests in the criminal justice system.1  Thus, 
prosecutors are responsible for garnering and maintaining the community’s 
trust in the system.  However, this trust may be undermined when the 
community suspects that prosecutors who hold different ethical views from 
the community cannot separate their biases from their duties and, therefore, 
cannot zealously advocate on behalf of the people of the community.2  In 
2014, residents of Orange County, Florida, faced such a conflict when 
Assistant State Attorney (ASA) Kenneth Lewis, who had a very active online 
 
 1. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.2(b) (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 2015). 
 2. See id. § 3-1.6. 
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presence, posted inflammatory statements on his social media pages.3  Upon 
discovering such posts, State Attorney Jeff Ashton warned ASA Lewis of his 
use of social media, temporarily reassigned him, and ultimately implemented 
a social media policy in 2015 to limit such discriminatory online posts by the 
office’s prosecutors.4  Despite the office’s implementation of the social 
media policy, on June 12, 2016—just hours after the shooting at Pulse, a gay 
nightclub in Orlando—ASA Lewis posted a rant on Twitter in which he 
stated that “Orlando is a national embarrassment” teeming with “3rd world 
miscreants and ghetto thugs.”5  ASA Lewis was ultimately suspended and 
fired from his position as a prosecutor on the ground that his online posts 
violated the office’s social media policy.6  However, ASA Lewis argued that 
such a policy violated his First Amendment rights because his comments 
were “non-work related” and were posted through his personal account 
outside of his employment hours.7  State Attorney Ashton admitted that ASA 
Lewis, despite his remarks, did not demonstrate any incompetence in his 
ability to exercise discretion fairly in his cases and therefore did not terminate 
 
 3. See, e.g., Gail Paschall-Brown, Prosecutor Ken Lewis Who Made ‘Crack Hoes’ 
Comment Reassigned Temporarily, WESH 2 NEWS (May 30, 2014, 5:59 AM), 
http://www.wesh.com/article/prosecutor-ken-lewis-who-made-crack-hoes-comment-
reassigned-temporarily/4434103 [http://perma.cc/53U6-LG5C] (“Happy Mother’s Day to all 
the crack hoes out there.  It’s never too late to turn it around.” (quoting ASA Lewis’s posts on 
his personal Facebook page)). 
 4. See David Caplan, Florida Assistant State Attorney Suspended for Controversial 
Facebook Post Following Orlando Attack, ABC NEWS (June 18, 2016, 5:20 AM), 
http://abcnews.go.com/US/florida-assistant-state-attorney-suspended-controversial-
facebook-post/story?id=39954404 [http://perma.cc/X89D-7XNV]; Summer Knowles, 
Prosecutor Fired over Facebook Post Sounds Off on Twitter, WESH 2 NEWS (June 24, 2016, 
7:34 AM), http://www.wesh.com/article/prosecutor-fired-over-facebook-post-sounds-off-on-
twitter/4450412 [http://perma.cc/P85R-L3UP].  State Attorney Ashton implemented a social 
media policy instead of firing ASA Lewis for such speech because Ashton felt that Lewis’s 
posts were covered under the First Amendment. See Evan Bleier, Florida Prosecutor 
Apologizes for ‘Crack Hoes’ Facebook Post on Mother’s Day:  Assistant State Attorney 
Kenneth Lewis Admitted That He Used a “Poor Choice of Words,” UPI (May 23, 2014, 11:13 
AM), http://www.upi.com/Odd_News/2014/05/23/Florida-prosecutor-apologizes-for-crack-
hoes-Facbeook-post-on-Mothers-Day/4131400855269/ [http://perma.cc/MC63-55Y6] 
(noting that State Attorney Jeff Ashton said he would not punish ASA Lewis for what was 
“clearly political speech”); Jeff Weiner, Prosecutor Says ‘Crack Hoes’ Facebook Post Was a 
‘Poor Choice of Words,’ ORLANDO SENTINEL (May 22, 2014), http://articles. 
orlandosentinel.com/2014-05-22/news/os-prosecutor-controversial-comments-20140522_1 
_facebook-post-poor-choice-state-attorney-jeff-ashton [http://perma.cc/J6R4-N6QT]. 
 5. Tobias Salinger, Florida Prosecutor Fired over Facebook Post Following Pulse 
Massacre Calling Downtown Orlando “A Melting Pot of 3rd World Miscreants and Ghetto 
Thugs,” N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 23, 2016, 6:41 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ 
national/prosecutor-fired-facebook-post-orlando-massacre-article-1.2685858 
[http://perma.cc/XM6U-D64B]; see also Kenneth Lewis (@Prosecutorslife), TWITTER (June 
12, 2016, 9:06 AM), https://twitter.com/Prosecutorslife/status/741980054515769348 
[http://perma.cc/PP34-UJEC] (“Orlando is a complete cesspool.  It is a melting pot of the 3rd 
world and ghetto thugs.”). 
 6. Kenneth Lewis had posted other inflammatory remarks on his Twitter feed. See, e.g., 
Kenneth Lewis (@Prosecutorslife), TWITTER (June 9, 2016, 7:10 AM) 
https://twitter.com/Prosecutorslife/status/740908820084359168 [http://perma.cc/V8RP-
XNY5] (“Has anyone who has been to Disney actually been to downtown Orlando?  It’s a 
giant toilet.”). 
 7. Salinger, supra note 5. 
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him.8  However, Ashton eventually terminated Lewis a year later on the 
ground that Lewis undermined the community’s trust in the criminal justice 
system.9  Thus, this situation presents a conflict between a prosecutor’s First 
Amendment right to freedom of speech and the community’s trust that the 
People’s interests will be adequately represented in the criminal justice 
system. 
This Note seeks to address this conflict by analyzing two specific 
questions.  First, how far should the First Amendment’s protection extend 
when a prosecutor’s private speech undermines the community’s trust in the 
criminal justice system?10  Second, can a prosecutor be terminated for 
engaging in speech that suggests the prosecutor’s personal viewpoints are 
drastically opposed to the interests of the community?  Part I of this Note 
gives an overview of the prosecutor’s unique role in society as well as the 
public’s perception and expectation of prosecutors as the People’s sole 
representatives in the criminal justice system.  This Part then discusses the 
heightened standards of professional responsibility prosecutors hold by 
examining the American Bar Association’s (ABA) Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct and Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution 
Function.  
Part II addresses two ethical concepts that underlie prosecutors’ 
professional responsibility—prosecutorial discretion and conflicts of interest.  
An understanding of these two ethical concepts helps to structure the 
discussion of whether and, if so, to what extent prosecutorial speech should 
be protected.  Part III identifies the legal concerns that the U.S. Supreme 
Court addresses in evaluating the extent to which prosecutors may exercise 
their freedom of speech.  This Part then discusses employment practices that 
several circuits have adopted in dealing with prosecutorial speech.  These 
discussions serve to lay out the legal landscape that frames the ultimate 
resolution of this Note by identifying constitutional limits to the stringent 
standards imposed on prosecutors.   
Part IV finally consolidates the legal and ethical concerns surrounding 
problematic prosecutorial speech and reemphasizes the importance of 
community trust in the criminal justice system.  Ultimately, this Note extends 
the current laws governing the employment of prosecutors by refining the 
definition of prosecutors’ employment and characterizing the People as the 
prosecutors’ employer.  With this characterization, this Note proposes that 
the People should be able to terminate prosecutors who express biases that 
 
 8. See Weiner, supra note 4 (“I’ve never had a victim come to us and say this man is not 
treating us with respect.”). 
 9. Elisha Fieldstadt, Suspended Florida Official Kenneth Lewis Fired over Anti-Orlando 
Facebook Post, NBC NEWS (June 25, 2016, 12:08 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ 
orlando-nightclub-massacre/suspended-florida-official-kenneth-lewis-fired-over-anti-
orlando-facebook-n598806 [https://perma.cc/729F-LMZM] (stating that Ashton decided to 
terminate Lewis because “public trust in the criminal justice system can only be maintained 
when those empowered to execute the law are, and are perceived to be, free of bias in the 
execution of their duties”). 
 10. See Knowles, supra note 4 (“When you have people believing prosecutors aren’t 
trying to defend everyone, it undermines faith in the justice system . . . .”). 
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undermine the community’s trust in their ability to carry out their duties 
effectively. 
I.  THE UNIQUE ROLE OF PROSECUTORS IN SOCIETY 
As the only people who can bring a criminal charge against a suspected 
criminal, prosecutors occupy a unique niche in the legal system and society.  
Part I.A first highlights the important role that prosecutors play in society.  In 
doing so, Part I.A establishes why a prosecutor must maintain the 
community’s trust in the criminal justice system to function effectively.  Part 
I.B then examines the ABA standards and rules that exist specifically to 
govern and regulate the professional responsibilities of prosecutors. 
A.  The Prosecutor as an Officer of the Court 
and Representative of the Criminal Justice System 
Prosecutors are unique in that they are the sole representatives of the 
community in a criminal trial.  Unlike in civil cases, where any litigant may 
easily choose and replace his or her counsel, in criminal cases, the community 
has only one option for representation:  the prosecutor.11  Furthermore, unlike 
civil or criminal defendants who can bring an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim against their counsel when they feel that they were 
inadequately represented, the community does not have the ability to sue a 
prosecutor for inadequate representation that leads to a defendant’s 
acquittal.12  If a prosecutor fails to fulfill his or her role adequately in 
prosecuting a criminal defendant, the community has no recourse.  Thus, 
prosecutors make up a body of plaintiffs’ lawyers who take on the role of 
being not only an officer of the court but also an irreplaceable representative 
within the criminal justice system.13 
Due to their role, prosecutors are expected to abide by more stringent 
standards of professional responsibility.  In discussing the professional 
responsibility of prosecutors, the ABA’s Criminal Justice Standards for the 
Prosecution Function expressly state that a prosecutor’s main goal is to seek 
justice and, in doing so, to “act with integrity and balanced judgment . . . by 
exercising discretion” appropriately.14  These standards exist to ensure that a 
prosecutor acts under a higher standard of professional responsibility than 
other lawyers to promote justice.15  If a prosecutor demonstrates that he or 
she lacks the ability to act with integrity and balanced judgment, it is 
 
 11. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.3 (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 2015). 
 12. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prevents individuals from being 
tried twice for the same crime. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be subject for the 
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”). 
 13. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.2(a)–(f). 
 14. Id. § 3-1.2(b). 
 15. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980) (“The 
responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate . . . .”).  The ABA 
standards are nonbinding, so a prosecutor who does not live up to these standards would not 
necessarily face sanctions, termination, or disbarment solely under these standards. CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.1(b). 
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questionable whether that individual is professionally fit to serve the public 
as a prosecutor.16 
Despite prosecutors’ heightened standards of professional responsibility, 
people have proven to be unsatisfied in terms of their trust in the criminal 
justice system.17  Annual surveys conducted from 1993 to 2017 consistently 
reveal that the public has very low confidence in the criminal justice 
system.18  The public’s negative perception of the court in the criminal justice 
system is rooted in concerns of inequitable treatment.19  In fact, the public 
views the criminal justice system as favoring suspects or offenders rather 
than victims.20  Therefore, any indication that prosecutors are biased21 or take 
any actions that contravene the public interest will make it more difficult for 
the prosecutors’ office to demonstrate that it meets the heightened standards 
of professional responsibility.22 
B.  The ABA’s Professional Standards for Prosecutors  
The ABA has published several rules, both in its Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct and its Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution 
Function, to regulate prosecutorial actions and guide prosecutors to meet 
heightened standards of professional responsibility.23  For instance, Rule 3.8 
of the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct regulates prosecutorial 
conduct both at the start of a potential criminal prosecution by requiring the 
 
 16. See Robert H. Jackson, U.S. Attorney Gen., Address at the Second Annual Conference 
of United States Attorneys:  The Federal Prosecutor (Apr. 1, 1940) (“[Prosecutors] are thus 
required to win an expression of confidence in [their] character by both the legislative and the 
executive branches of the government before assuming the responsibilities of a . . . 
prosecutor.”). 
 17. See Julian V. Roberts, Public Opinion, Crime, and Criminal Justice, 16 CRIME & JUST. 
99, 131 (1992) (“There is also a perception—held by a significant number of Americans—that 
one of the causes of crime is the criminal justice system itself.”). 
 18. Confidence in Institutions, GALLUP, http://news.gallup.com/poll/1597/%20 
Confidence-Institutions.aspx [http://perma.cc/TBB3-8XU2] (last visited Nov. 19, 2017) 
(showing that less than one-third of the surveyed population in recent years has a great deal of 
confidence in the criminal justice system); see also Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and 
Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 951 (2006) (“Perhaps because 
of these factors, nearly three-quarters of Americans lack much confidence and trust in the 
criminal justice system.”); Roberts, supra note 17, at 139 (noting that surveys reveal judges 
and prosecutors to be among the least credible actors within the criminal justice system). 
 19. Roberts, supra note 17, at 140 (“Negative attitudes toward the courts focus on . . . 
perceptions that certain groups are treated inequitably . . . .”). 
 20. Id. 
 21. This bias also comes into play in the public perception of sentencing. See id. at 142 
(explaining the need for a scale of severity in punishments to correlate with public perception 
of the severity of the crime itself). 
 22. See generally id. 
 23. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.1(b) (AM. 
BAR ASS’N 2015) (noting that the standards, along with the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct, serve to provide guidance as to what the best practices would be for prosecutors).  
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, much like the Model Penal Code, are general 
standards that have been adopted either entirely or in large part by states in writing their own 
set of rules for professional responsibility.  These rules are not statutes and do not have the 
force of law, but they are used as guidelines in disciplinary proceedings to regulate the actions 
of lawyers. 
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prosecutor to find probable cause before prosecuting a charge24 and at the 
end of the criminal prosecution by requiring a prosecutor to remedy a 
wrongful conviction.25  These rules serve to keep prosecutors in check by 
making sure that they do not prosecute individuals for an improper purpose.26  
Included within the scope of improper purposes are personal biases, both 
implicit and explicit, that may be manifested by a prosecutor’s words or 
conduct.27 
These rules mainly address situations in which the prosecutor is 
subjectively biased against the criminal defendant and thereby prosecutes 
that individual with an improper motive.  However, the rules fail to address 
situations in which a prosecutor’s bias sways his or her discretion in favor of 
the criminal defendant, thereby contravening the public’s interest.28  In other 
words, if a prosecutor demonstrates that he or she is fine with—or even 
supportive of—actions that the community deems repugnant, how can the 
People trust that prosecutor, or any other prosecutor in the same office, to 
prosecute readily those crimes the community seeks to punish?  The ABA’s 
rules and standards do nothing to promote the community’s trust in the 
criminal justice system when a prosecutor holds a view that contravenes 
public interest.  This is problematic because, due to the prosecutor’s 
irreplaceable role, the People—and the victim—are left with no legal 
recourse in the criminal justice system when a prosecutor does not zealously 
prosecute a particular case.  Thus, it is imperative that the system has a means 
of ensuring and protecting the “people’s right to counsel,” which entails that 
prosecutors will zealously prosecute crimes that the community seeks to 
punish. 
II.  ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN EXTENDING OR LIMITING 
FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF PROSECUTORIAL SPEECH 
Notwithstanding the rules and standards that govern prosecutors, no 
regulation expressly limits prosecutorial speech beyond the scope of a 
 
 24. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). 
 25. Id. r. 3.8(h).  These principles are also reflected in the heightened duty of candor for 
prosecutors as opposed to other lawyers. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION 
FUNCTION § 3-1.4. 
 26. See Jackson, supra note 16 (“While the prosecutor at his best is one of the most 
beneficent forces in our society, when he acts from malice or other base motives, he is one of 
the worst.”).  The principles underlying these rules are also apparent in civil claims of 
malicious prosecution against a prosecutor who brought charges against a criminal defendant 
for an improper motive. See, e.g., Sorrell v. County of Nassau, 162 F. Supp. 3d 156, 170 
(E.D.N.Y. 2016) (defining malicious prosecution as bringing criminal charges with “a wrong 
or improper motive, something other than a desire to see the ends of justice served” (quoting 
Khan v. Ryan, 145 F. Supp. 2d 280, 285 (E.D.N.Y. 2001))); Bianchi v. McQueen, 58 N.E.3d 
680, 699 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) (“‘Malice’ in the context of malicious prosecution is defined as 
the actuation of a prosecution for an improper motive.”). 
 27. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.6. 
 28. See Jackson, supra note 16 (“If the prosecutor is obliged to choose his cases, it follows 
that he can choose his defendants.  Therein is the most dangerous power of the prosecutor:  
that he will pick people that he thinks he should get, rather than pick cases that need to be 
prosecuted.”). 
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prosecutor’s employment.29  The ABA’s Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct, as well as the ABA’s Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution 
Function, establish two ethical values that help to inform the discussion of 
such prosecutorial speech—prosecutorial discretion30 and conflict of 
interest.31  Because the public inevitably relies heavily on the prosecutorial 
system to bring charges against criminal defendants, it is imperative that the 
public is assured that its prosecutors will not allow personal biases to 
improperly sway their discretion.  In the event of a bias that is bound to result 
in an improper influence on the prosecutor, the public would expect the 
prosecutor to recuse himself or herself from the case for having a conflict of 
interest.32  However, because it is impractical for even the most biased 
prosecutor to recuse himself or herself from every single case, the public 
needs some degree of confidence in their prosecutors’ viewpoints or in their 
ability to separate their viewpoints from their duties. 
Part II.A discusses how the wide scope of prosecutorial discretion, 
although a core value for the criminal justice system, raises concerns about a 
prosecutor’s personal biases.  This Part also highlights how prosecutorial 
discretion is virtually undetectable and highly unregulated by the courts, 
thereby providing little substantive guidance for prosecutorial speech.  Part 
II.B points out that there are more substantive regulations when a prosecutor 
has a conflict of interest.  However, this Part further explains that, while the 
underlying principles are useful in addressing the issue that this Note 
addresses, the substantive regulations themselves do little to address 
prosecutorial speech that demonstrates a problematic viewpoint. 
A.  The Largely Unregulated Nature of Prosecutorial Discretion 
Prosecutors exercise wide discretion in almost every aspect of the criminal 
justice system, from bail hearings and granting immunity to charging and 
sentencing.33  One important area in which prosecutors exercise wide, 
unreviewable34 discretion is in filing criminal charges—a duty, and authority, 
 
 29. See infra Part III.B. 
 30. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION §§ 3-4.2, 3-4.4. 
 31. Id. § 3-1.7. 
 32. See, e.g., id. § 3-1.7(a). 
 33. See Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 717, 741 (1996).  See generally Jackson, supra note 16. 
 34. Misner, supra note 33, at 743 (“The prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute a case is 
virtually unreviewable.”); see also United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 122 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(“[T]he decision . . . whether to prosecute generally rests within broad discretion of the 
prosecutor, and a prosecutor’s pretrial charging decision is presumed legitimate.” (first 
alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Sanders, 211 F.3d 711, 716 (2d Cir. 2000))); 
Mikhail v. Kahn, 991 F. Supp. 2d 596, 637 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (“‘[W]hether to prosecute and 
what charge to file or bring before federal grand jury are decisions that generally rest in the 
prosecutor’s discretion,’ and even when individuals are wronged in a manner cognizable under 
criminal law, they ‘do not have a constitutional right to the prosecution of alleged criminals.’” 
(quoting United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979); then quoting Capogrosso v. 
Supreme Court, 588 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam))); United States v. Cameron, 
658 F. Supp. 2d 241, 244 (D. Me. 2009) (“[The government’s] broad discretion [as to whom 
to prosecute] is based largely on the recognition that ‘the decision to prosecute is particularly 
ill-suited to judicial review.’” (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985))); 
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that make the prosecutor one of the most influential players in the criminal 
justice system.35  As characterized by Attorney General Robert H. Jackson, 
however, this tremendous discretion is dangerous because it gives the 
prosecutor “more control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other 
person in America.”36  Unfortunately, it is impossible to know—and 
therefore impossible to monitor—what considerations a prosecutor makes 
when exercising his or her discretion,37 but that is why lawyers, and thus 
prosecutors, are expected to have a requisite standing of good character 
before being admitted to their state’s bar.38 
Even if it seems unfavorable to grant prosecutors such wide discretion, 
prosecutorial discretion must be preserved, first and foremost, because it is 
practically unfeasible for any prosecutor to investigate every crime.39  The 
centralization of discretion to the prosecutor’s office is the result of historical 
development, and, as of now, granting this discretion to prosecutors is the 
most efficient method of maintaining a functional criminal justice system.40  
 
United States v. Tobin, 598 F. Supp. 2d 125, 132 (D. Me. 2009) (“To be sure, courts must 
tread lightly when assessing prosecutorial charging decisions.  ‘Whether to prosecute and what 
charge to file or bring before a grand jury are decisions that generally rest in the prosecutor’s 
discretion.’  These decisions are necessarily informed by sensitive judgments about 
dangerousness, deterrence, and enforcement priorities, which courts ought not readily second-
guess.” (citation omitted) (quoting Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 124). 
 35. See Misner, supra note 33, at 743 (“In the area of charging, prosecutorial decisions—
such as whether to prosecute, how to prosecute, how long to sentence, and whether to dismiss 
charges—all contribute to the creation of the prosecutor as the real policy-maker within the 
criminal justice system.”); see also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978) (“There 
is no doubt that the breadth of discretion that our country’s legal system vests in prosecuting 
attorneys carries with it the potential for both individual and institutional abuse.”). 
 36. Jackson, supra note 16. 
 37. Richard M. Re, Imagining Perfect Surveillance, 64 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 264, 
286 (2016) (“Further, it was generally difficult or even impossible for any other institutional 
actor to monitor executive enforcement decisions, if only because there were so many 
discretionary choices that most would inevitably evade review.”). 
 38. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980) (“Before 
recommending an applicant for admission, a lawyer should satisfy himself that the applicant 
is of good moral character.”); Comment, Procedural Due Process and Character Hearings 
for Bar Applicants, 15 STAN. L. REV. 500, 500 (1963) (“Every state in the United States, as a 
prerequisite for admission to the practice of law, requires that applicants possess ‘good moral 
character.’” (quoting RULES FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR IN THE UNITED STATES AND 
TERRITORIES (36th ed. 1959))); Jackson, supra note 16 (“[T]he post of Federal District 
Attorney from the very beginning has been safeguarded by presidential appointment, 
requiring . . . an expression of confidence in . . . character . . . before assuming the 
responsibilities of a federal prosecutor.”).  See generally NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, 
NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 1-2.1 (3d ed. 2009) (emphasizing that prosecutors are 
to exercise good faith and integrity in their professional capacity and place the interests of 
society at large before anything else); infra Part III.C.1 (discussing Hale v. Committee on 
Character & Fitness, 335 F.3d 678 (7th Cir. 2003)). 
 39. Jackson, supra note 16 (“There is a most important reason why the prosecutor should 
have, as nearly as possible, a detached and impartial view of all groups in his community.  Law 
enforcement is not automatic.  It isn’t blind.  One of the greatest difficulties of the position of 
prosecutor is that he must pick his cases, because no prosecutor can even investigate all of the 
cases in which he receives complaints.”). 
 40. Misner, supra note 33, at 718–19 (“Because courts cannot mold an effective system 
of law enforcement, and because legislatures are unsuited to the daily implementation of broad 
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Furthermore, courts have historically been unsuccessful in their attempts to 
impose any sort of judicial review on prosecutors and have therefore been 
increasingly more deferential to prosecutors’ discretion.41 
The law provides some, albeit minimal, protections for criminal 
defendants from prosecutors who may be influenced by personal biases and 
consequently exercise discretion improperly.  In interpreting the Due Process 
Clause, the Supreme Court has held that a prosecutor’s discretion and 
decision to charge a defendant may not be “deliberately based upon an 
unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary 
classification.”42  The ABA Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution 
Function—although not legally binding—also provides that “prosecutor[s] 
should not manifest or exercise, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based 
upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, 
gender identity, or socioeconomic status.”43  Furthermore, in interpreting the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, the Court has held that a 
person’s constitutional rights are violated when a public official representing 
the state acts in such a way that practically denies a person the equal 
protection of the law.44 
Still, while the law protects criminal defendants from prosecutors who act 
under unjustifiable biases, the law does not protect the community from 
prosecutors who express such biases through speech rather than through 
conduct in a particular case.  Thus, the question remains as to whether a 
prosecutor who holds and expresses bias or animosity through speech can be 
entrusted with such expansive discretion.45 
B.  Conflict of Interest as a Restraint on the Scope of Representation 
Prosecutors have a duty to be impartial, neutral, and disinterested in their 
role as advocates for justice.46  Although this Note addresses the problems 
associated with the expression of a prosecutor’s personal views, it would be 
unreasonable to require prosecutors to hold no personal views at all.  In fact, 
 
policy, the time has come to encourage prosecutors to fashion local policies of law 
enforcement to suit the current needs of their communities.”). 
 41. Id. at 736. 
 42. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (citing Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 
U.S. 357, 364 (1978)); see also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996).  
Similarly, courts limit prosecutors’ unconstitutional discretion in the context of jury selection. 
See generally Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 43. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.6(a) (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 2015). 
 44. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886) (“No reason for [the disparate 
treatment] is shown, and the conclusion cannot be resisted that no reason for it exists except 
hostility to the race and nationality to which the petitioners belong, and which, in the eye of 
the law, is not justified.  The discrimination is therefore illegal, and the public administration 
which enforces it is a denial of the equal protection of the laws, and a violation of the 
fourteenth amendment of the constitution.”). 
 45. Situations in which prosecutors hold biases but do not express them are beyond the 
scope of this Note. 
 46. Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Rethinking Prosecutors’ Conflicts of Interest, 58 
B.C. L. REV. 464, 471 (2017). 
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prosecutors themselves may not be aware that the implicit or cognitive biases 
they have are affecting their work in unconscious ways.47  Realistically, 
every prosecutor holds some political preference or personal belief, and it 
would not be a ridiculous proposition to state that virtually all “of [a] lawyer’s 
political, social, and emotional interests, as well as the full spectrum of the 
lawyer’s thoughts, beliefs [and] feelings” may influence a prosecutor’s 
decision-making process.48  What would be ridiculous, however, is to say 
that all such interests create an unwaivable conflict that would bar the 
prosecutor from properly functioning as an officer of the court and a 
representative of the criminal justice system.49  In fact, the ABA, as well as 
the judiciary, acknowledge that prosecutors should be allowed to have 
personal views as long as the prosecutor keeps his or her professional work 
completely separated from those views.50 
The standard for determining whether a prosecutor can try a case despite 
having conflicting interests hinges on whether the conflict adversely affects 
the prosecutor’s performance.51  For example, because ASA Kenneth Lewis 
 
 47. Id. at 483 (“The professional literature has traditionally assumed that private lawyers’ 
conflicting interests can influence their exercise of professional judgment in unconscious 
ways.  This is no less true for prosecutors.”); see also Developments in the Law—Conflicts of 
Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1244, 1296 (1981); Tigran W. Eldred, The 
Psychology of Conflicts of Interest in Criminal Cases, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 43, 48 (2009). 
 48. Green & Roiphe, supra note 46, at 472; see also ROY D. SIMON WITH NICOLE HYLAND, 
SIMON’S NEW YORK RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT ANNOTATED 418–20 (2017). 
 49. See Green & Roiphe, supra note 46, at 476–77 (“If conflicts of interest are broadly 
conceived to include any ‘political, social, and emotional interests’ or ‘thoughts, beliefs, 
feelings, and creeds’ that may affect the prosecutor’s decision-making, then a similar 
allegation could be made no matter which prosecutor is assigned to a criminal case with 
political implications.”). 
 50. See Johnston v. Koppes, 850 F.2d 594, 596 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Loyalty to a client 
requires subordination of a lawyer’s personal interests when acting in a professional capacity.  
But loyalty to a client does not require extinguishment of a lawyer’s deepest 
convictions . . . .”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (“A 
lawyer’s representation of a client, including representation by appointment, does not 
constitute an endorsement of the client’s political, economic, social or moral views or 
activities.”); see also NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 
1-2.1(b) (3d ed. 2009) (“A prosecutor should not express personal animosity toward opposing 
counsel, regardless of personal opinion.”).  Of course, there is a distinction between a 
prosecutor’s conflicts and an ordinary lawyer’s conflicts because a prosecutor’s client is 
society rather than an individual. See Green & Roiphe, supra note 46, at 465 & nn.5–6. 
 51. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(2) (“[A] lawyer shall not 
represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest.  A concurrent 
conflict of interest exists if . . . there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more 
clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former 
client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.”), with id. r. 1.7(b)(1) 
(“Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under paragraph (a), a 
lawyer may represent a client if . . . the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able 
to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client . . . .”).  From an 
administrative standpoint, courts have the right to determine whether a prosecutor has a 
conflict of interest that will adversely affect the prosecutor’s performance. See 58 AM. JUR. 2D 
New Trial § 135 (2012) (“A trial court has the power to disqualify a prosecuting attorney from 
proceeding with a particular criminal prosecution if it is determined that the prosecuting 
attorney suffers from a conflict of interest that might prejudice him or her against the 
accused.”); see, e.g., State v. Williams, 217 N.W.2d 573, 575 (Iowa 1974) (“If there was a 
conflict of interest it does not follow it affected the outcome of the trial. . . .  [W]e find no 
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was not assigned to the Orlando nightclub case, he had no conflict despite 
having expressed animus toward the victims of the massacre.  However, the 
situation may change if ASA Lewis were, in fact, assigned to this case or any 
other case that involves gay people, mothers, or other groups of people 
against whom he demonstrated a personal bias.52  Nonetheless, while the 
current rules concerning a prosecutor’s conflict of interest aid in determining 
whether a criminal defendant’s rights have been violated during a criminal 
trial,53 the rules do not address the main question whether a particular 
prosecutor should even be allowed to serve the community despite his or her 
personal biases. 
A common practice in the legal profession is to have the lawyer or 
prosecutor recuse himself or herself from a case when a conflict exists.54  
Therefore, if ASA Lewis’s biases are considered conflicts, he would have to 
recuse himself from cases dealing with gay people or mothers.  However, 
although seemingly simple, such a recusal is impractical. 
There are two tiers of conflicts:  potential conflicts and per se conflicts.55  
Potential conflicts are those in which a court evaluates the possibility that 
some relationship between the lawyer and another person could affect the 
fairness of the present case, whereas per se conflicts have a presumption of 
prejudice and require an affirmative waiver to overcome.56  One factor that 
courts use to determine the existence of a per se conflict is “whether, and to 
what extent, public confidence in the integrity of the law profession might be 
compromised or eroded by permitting the case to proceed notwithstanding 
the potential for mischief.”57  Whether ASA Lewis must be recused from 
cases involving parties who are gay, mothers, or otherwise “distasteful” to 
him would then pose a hybrid or intermediate tier of conflict:  would the 
potential, or likelihood, of a per se conflict entirely bar a prosecutor from 
taking cases that involve parties against whom the prosecutor is biased?58 
While it would be efficient to consider a publicly known, biased prosecutor 
to have a per se conflict of interest in any case that involves parties toward 
whom the prosecutor has demonstrated bias, such considerations would also 
 
indication a conflict of interest on the part of the county attorney had any effect on the conduct 
or outcome of the trial.”). 
 52. See Green & Roiphe, supra note 46, at 465–66 (“Broadly construed, prosecutors’ 
conflicts can arise not only out of personal and professional relationships . . . but [also] out of 
any personal belief . . . that undermines the prosecutors’ ability to pursue justice in a 
disinterested way.”); supra Part I.A. 
 53. See 58 AM. JUR. 2D New Trial § 135 (2012) (“[A]s a general rule, some resulting 
prejudice to the defendant must be demonstrated to warrant a new trial even though such a 
conflict of interest exists.” (emphasis added)). 
 54. See, e.g., CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.7(a) 
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2015). 
 55. See State v. Norman, 697 A.2d 511, 520 (N.J. 1997) (“Bellucci thus created a two-tier 
system for evaluating conflict-of-interest claims . . . .”). 
 56. Id.; State v. Shieka, 766 A.2d 1151, 1160 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). 
 57. Shieka, 766 A.2d at 1161. 
 58. Because the biased prosecutor has not been assigned to a case, there is no per se 
conflict.  However, the evaluation of the potential conflict requires an examination as to 
whether a per se conflict would exist in the event that the prosecutor does, in fact, take a case 
that involves the very group of people toward whom he or she has animosity. 
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greatly limit the scope of cases that any prosecutor can take once he or she 
expresses personal bias.  The regulations surrounding conflicts of interest 
would thus undermine the functionality of the prosecutors’ office because 
constant recusals detract from prosecutors’ ability to function effectively.  
Narrow rules require prosecutors to recuse themselves only from cases where 
a conflict of interest exists.59  Classification of certain forms of speech as 
conflicts could ultimately cause such rules to constructively remove a 
prosecutor from office when he or she has too many “conflicts” to take on 
any cases.  Such an application might hinder the efficiency of the prosecutor’s 
office and prevent many lawyers from becoming prosecutors.  Therefore, an 
attempt to extend the existing rules concerning conflicts of interest reveals 
the inability of current regulations to handle prosecutors who express biases 
that contravene the public’s interest. 
III.  EXISTING LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON PROSECUTORIAL SPEECH 
FOCUS ONLY ON ADVERSE EFFECTS WITHIN THE WORKPLACE 
Although standards surrounding prosecutorial discretion and conflicts of 
interest do not adequately regulate the expressions of a biased prosecutor, 
prosecutorial speech is not untethered.  Legal restraints exist in both the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment as it applies to 
prosecutors60 as well as in other rules within the ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct.61  The First Amendment of the Constitution grants 
citizens, among many rights, the freedom of speech.62  However, public 
employees—especially prosecutors—have fewer protections of speech under 
the First Amendment because their speech may directly and adversely affect 
their offices’ ability to function effectively.63 
Before addressing whether prosecutorial speech that undermines 
community trust in the criminal justice system may be limited absent any 
apparent, adverse effect on performance, it helps to examine the broader 
concerns of the Supreme Court in its interpretation and limitation of free 
speech for prosecutors.  Part III.A first discusses First Amendment 
jurisprudence as it applies to public employees and explains how public 
employees have qualified protections under the First Amendment by virtue 
of their employment in a public office.  This Part focuses its discussion on 
three Supreme Court cases that establish and highlight these limitations.  Part 
III.B then extends the discussion and examines how prosecutors have even 
fewer protections of speech under the ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct when speech is related to prosecutors’ cases.  Finally, Part III.C 
discusses how certain states apply these qualified protections to help 
 
 59. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT rr. 1.7–1.11 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980) (stating that 
lawyers need only to refuse or withdraw from the representation of a client when a conflict 
exists). 
 60. See infra Part III.A. 
 61. See infra Part III.B. 
 62. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 63. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006). 
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determine whether the office should hire or fire a particular individual who 
expressed certain viewpoints. 
A.  The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of 
First Amendment Rights for Public Employees 
In an effort to preserve the freedom of speech for citizens, the Supreme 
Court has interpreted the First Amendment to protect even the most 
outlandish statements made by citizens as long as the speech does not pose 
an imminent lawless action that ought to be prevented.64  Thus, the 
Constitution protects individuals’ speech even when the speech is 
inflammatory or otherwise provocative of others’ emotions.65  If, however, a 
prosecutor expresses hatred toward a particular group of people, as did ASA 
Lewis, citizens may justifiably feel unsafe or unprotected in their own 
country or state.  This threat is amplified by the fact that charging decisions 
are solely up to the prosecutors’ discretion and are not subject to judicial 
review, thereby eliminating any legal recourse for the public when a 
prosecutor decides to prosecute—or dismiss—a certain criminal charge.66 
Furthermore, because a prosecutor is an employee of the state or federal 
government, his or her expression of bias may broadcast mixed messages to 
the public concerning the state or federal government’s views.67  Prosecutors 
ought to pursue justice rather than any particular individual’s interests.68  
 
 64. Compare Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 505 (1951) (holding that advocating 
for communism created a clear and present danger and should thus be prohibited), and 
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (prohibiting the distribution of leaflets urging 
resistance of the draft because such words presented a clear and present danger during 
wartime), with Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (utilizing the 
“imminent lawless action” standard and interpreting the First Amendment so as not to ban any 
viewpoint absent an imminent lawless act).  The imminent lawless action standard is looser 
than the clear and present danger standard. 
 65. Because the Constitution grants protections for opinions, unless there is a specified 
target of an imminent lawless action—which would constitute hate speech—there is no 
violation of a constitutional right for someone who feels offended or threatened by that speech. 
See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (holding that burning a cross 
on the lawn of an African American family is a protected form of expression despite its 
threatening symbolism of the Ku Klux Klan); Nat’l Socialist Party v. Village of Skokie, 432 
U.S. 43, 44 (1977) (holding that using a swastika to demonstrate against the Jewish population 
was a protected opinion because it is general speech that can be directed toward anyone). 
 66. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 67. The Constitution grants states the right to express viewpoints so long as the states do 
not impose these viewpoints on citizens. See Walker v. Sons of Confederate Veterans, 135 S. 
Ct. 2239, 2245–46 (2015).  State speech is generally inferred from a certain action of policy 
that endorses a particular viewpoint. See, e.g., id. at 2253 (permitting states to choose the 
content of their speech by denying the placement of confederate flags on a customized license 
plate); Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 689–90 (2010) (allowing state 
universities to deny support for student organizations that do not adopt an antidiscrimination 
policy); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 203 (1991) (holding that granting of funds to families 
not participating in abortion planning is a permitted form of speech by the state).  But see 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 821 (1995) (finding that 
imposing financial burdens on an “unfavorable” group is discriminatory and therefore a 
violation of the First Amendment). 
 68. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.2(b) (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 2015) (“The primary duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice within the bounds of the 
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However, when a prosecutor who works for the state holds a different opinion 
or viewpoint than that set forth by the state, the state has an interest in limiting 
or separating that prosecutor’s speech from its own.  Thus, First Amendment 
jurisprudence concerning free speech for prosecutors is predominantly 
concerned with balancing the public’s interest in having an informed, 
unhindered discussion about matters of public concern with the state’s 
interest in ensuring that its functionality is not compromised by the 
constitutional rights of its employees.69 
Due to the potential conflicts that arise between public employees and the 
state, the protections under the First Amendment are limited when applied to 
state or federal officials.  When employed by the government, individuals are 
expected to waive certain constitutional rights.70  This expectation stems 
from the notion that the government as an employer needs greater control 
over its employees to function effectively.71  The contravening concern, 
however, is that a public official’s employment may not be conditioned on 
an infringement of that individual’s constitutional freedom of expression.72 
The Court in Connick v. Myers73 held that “content, form, and context” are 
crucial in determining whether particular speech should be protected.74  
When Sheila Myers, an Assistant District Attorney in New Orleans, was 
being transferred to another section, she expressed her opposition to the 
transfer by discussing her complaints about several office matters, including 
the office transfer policy.75  She subsequently circulated a questionnaire to 
ask other assistant district attorneys about their opinions concerning these 
office matters.76 
Justice Byron White emphasized that the Court has an interest in 
“ensur[ing] that citizens are not deprived of fundamental rights by virtue of 
working for the government.”77  Nonetheless, this interest does not mean that 
government employees have an absolute right of free speech.  Rather, 
governments have relatively broad authority to manage the speech of their 
employees when the content, form, and context of the expression78 “cannot 
be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other 
concern to the community.”79  Absent this authority, employers will be 
forced to keep “a disruptive or otherwise unsatisfactory employee,” and the 
retention of such a prosecutor would “ultimately impair the efficiency of [the] 
 
law[,] . . . [to] serve[] the public interest and . . . increase public safety[,] . . . protect the 
innocent and convict the guilty, consider the interests of victims and witnesses, and respect 
the constitutional and legal rights of all persons, including suspects and defendants.”). 
 69. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 573 (1968). 
 70. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983). 
 73. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
 74. Id. at 147–48. 
 75. Id. at 141. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 147. 
 78. Id. at 147–48. 
 79. Id. at 146. 
1346 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
office.”80  Due to this qualification, the Court held that Myers’s questionnaire 
was not protected under the First Amendment because it did not “bring to 
light actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust on the part of 
Connick and others.”81  The questionnaire, if released to the public, would 
only indicate that an employee is not satisfied with her office’s policies.82 
In an effort to consolidate the contrary interests of a public employee and 
the government, the Court narrowly classified unprotected speech in Garcetti 
v. Ceballos.83  Because public employees are nonetheless citizens, any 
restrictions on their constitutional rights as a condition of employment must 
be limited to what is necessary for the employer to efficiently and effectively 
perform its services.84 
After receiving a call from a defense attorney alleging that an affidavit 
used to obtain a search warrant was inaccurate, Deputy District Attorney 
Richard Ceballos examined the affidavit and realized that it contained serious 
misrepresentations.85  In his attempt to remedy the misrepresentations, 
Ceballos submitted a memorandum to his supervisor recommending a 
dismissal of the case on the ground that the search warrant resulted from 
misrepresentations.86  However, Ceballos’s supervisor ignored the 
memorandum and continued to prosecute the case.87  At the close of the case, 
the supervisor reassigned Ceballos, transferred him to another courthouse, 
and denied him a promotion.88  Ceballos asserted that he was retaliated 
against for the content of the memorandum, which should have been 
protected by the First Amendment.89 
The Court was faced with the question of how far the First Amendment 
extends beyond the individual speaker to the public at large.  Justice Kennedy 
reemphasized in Garcetti the extent to which the First Amendment may 
protect a public employee:  the Court held that a public official’s speech is 
protected only when the public official is not acting within his or her official 
capacity.90  Contrarily, because Ceballos was speaking pursuant to his duties, 
the content of the memorandum was not protected under the First 
Amendment.91  Thus, when the motivation and opportunity for speaking on 
any given matter are created by the government by virtue of the prosecutor’s 
 
 80. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974). 
 81. Connick, 461 U.S. at 148. 
 82. Id. 
 83. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 84. Id. at 419. 
 85. Id. at 413–14. 
 86. Id. at 414. 
 87. Id. at 414–15. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 415. 
 90. Id. at 417 (“The Court has made clear that public employees do not surrender all their 
First Amendment rights by reason of their employment.  Rather, the First Amendment protects 
a public employee’s right, in certain circumstances, to speak as a citizen addressing matters of 
public concern.”). 
 91. Id. at 421 (“We hold that when public employees make statements pursuant to their 
official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and 
the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”). 
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employment, that speech is subject to the government’s control in all 
respects.92  The Court emphasized that the controlling factor in Garcetti was 
that Ceballos was acting pursuant to his duties, not that Ceballos made his 
speech within the workplace or spoke of a matter pertinent to his 
employment.93  However, the Court also noted that no limitation of the First 
Amendment may infringe upon the public’s right to an “informed, vibrant 
dialogue in a democratic society.”94 
In fact, the Court has long emphasized the importance of preserving speech 
that contributes to the public forum.95  In Pickering v. Board of Education,96 
Marvin L. Pickering, a high school teacher in Illinois, was terminated from 
his position for submitting a letter to a local newspaper criticizing the school 
district’s means of raising revenue.97  Although the school justified its actions 
by saying the letter was detrimental to the interests of the education system,98 
the Supreme Court held that Pickering’s termination was wrongful and 
violated his First Amendment right to freedom of speech.99 
The Court noted that the fundamental goal of democracy is to preserve 
“[t]he public interest in having free and unhindered debate on matters of 
public importance.”100  As citizens of a democratic society, public employees 
must have the right to comment “on matters of public concern.”101  The Court 
sidestepped the concern of public employers by stating that, when speech 
concerns a matter of public importance, the fact that the declarant is a public 
employee is unrelated to the individual’s interest in speaking as a member of 
the public.102 
Ultimately, these cases demonstrate that prosecutorial speech is not 
protected when the speech (1) interferes with the office’s functions, (2) is 
 
 92. Id. at 421–22 (“Restricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s 
professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed 
as a private citizen.  It simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what the employer 
itself has commissioned or created.”). 
 93. Id. at 420–21. 
 94. Id. at 419. 
 95. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573–74 (1968). 
 96. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
 97. Id. at 564. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 574–75. 
 100. Id. at 573. 
 101. Id. at 574; see also Johnston v. Koppes, 850 F.2d 594, 596 (1988) (extending 
employees’ rights beyond freedom of speech to freedom of association and holding that 
transferring an employee for attending an abortion rights panel during her vacation was a 
violation of the employee’s First Amendment rights because abortion is a matter “of great 
public concern”).  Although this is an absolute right granted by the First Amendment, the 
Court laid out some qualifying factors.  Because the public interest lies in having an 
unhindered debate, the Court excludes statements that would not add to the public debate, 
including statements made by a declarant who either knows of or recklessly disregards the 
falsity of the statement. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 573. 
 102. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574 (“However, in a case such as the present one, in which the 
fact of employment is only tangentially and insubstantially involved in the subject matter of 
the public communication made by a teacher, we conclude that it is necessary to regard the 
teacher as the member of the general public he seeks to be.”). 
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made pursuant to the prosecutor’s duties, or (3) does not address a matter of 
public concern. 
B.  Prohibited Use of Private Speech for Prosecutors 
Prosecutorial speech is also regulated, to some extent, by the ABA Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct.  Rule 3.8(f) of the ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct requires prosecutors to 
refrain from making extrajudicial comments that have a substantial 
likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the accused and exercise 
reasonable care to prevent investigators, law enforcement personnel, 
employees or other persons assisting or associated with the prosecutor in a 
criminal case from making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor 
would [otherwise] be prohibited from making.103 
Thus, a prosecutor may not use extrajudicial statements to benefit the 
prosecution’s case against a criminal defendant.104  Under this rule, a 
prosecutor who makes a statement that is otherwise protected under the First 
Amendment, such as commenting on a matter of public concern,105 may be 
prohibited from exercising that right because it violates the defendant’s due 
process right under the Constitution106 and interferes, either positively or 
negatively, with the office’s mission to pursue justice fairly.107 
While a narrow reading of Rule 3.8 yields a simple regulation stating that 
prosecutors may not use extrajudicial statements to gain an advantage over a 
criminal defendant beyond what the evidence admitted at trial allows, a 
broader reading interprets Rule 3.8 as a limitation of prosecutorial conduct.  
Under that broader reading, prosecutors cannot use their speech to reach 
beyond their professional capacity and thereby further their case.  Thus, the 
underlying principle may be that prosecutors cannot use their private, 
extrajudicial statements to promulgate their own views or personal opinions 
in any professional matter, even if it is not necessarily linked to unfairly, or 
illegally, disadvantaging a defendant in a particular case.108  Whereas the 
narrower reading is concerned with a criminal defendant’s constitutional 
right,109 the broader reading is concerned with a prosecutor’s professional 
responsibility.110  Under the broader reading, ASA Lewis’s extrajudicial 
statements expressing his animus toward gay people and mothers is a form 
 
 103. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). 
 104. For a detailed discussion of contemporary limitations of prosecutorial speech within 
the scope of their employment as outlined by the ABA, see generally Emily A. Vance, Note, 
Should Prosecutors Blog, Post, or Tweet?:  The Need for New Restraints in Light of Social 
Media, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 367 (2015). 
 105. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574. 
 106. U.S. CONST. amend XIV. 
 107. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.2(b) (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 2015); see also Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006). 
 108. See, e.g., Green & Roiphe, supra note 46, at 471 (discussing personal interests as a 
conflict of interest prosecutors may have, which would undermine their necessary 
disinterestedness in their role). 
 109. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 110. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
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of speech that can unfairly sway, either positively or negatively, the public’s 
attitude toward either the victim or perpetrator of certain crimes and could 
therefore be prohibited. 
C.  Hiring and Firing of a Prosecutor 
Based on the Individual’s Viewpoints 
State Attorney Jeff Ashton believed that he was not able to fire ASA 
Kenneth Lewis for Lewis’s initial posts about mothers due to the First 
Amendment.111  Instead, Ashton implemented a social media policy in the 
office and later used that policy as ground for ASA Lewis’s termination.112  
However, it is unclear whether Ashton needed to implement a social media 
policy in order to fire ASA Lewis.  Kenneth Lewis was a prosecutor, and 
prosecutors are expected to possess a certain requisite character that ensures 
the ability to pursue justice.113  Ashton could have fired ASA Lewis for not 
possessing the requisite character demanded of a prosecutor.  In fact, the 
Illinois State Bar has even considered an applicant’s expressions of his 
personal views in denying him admission.114  Thus, it follows logically that 
prosecutors, who are held to a higher standard of professional responsibility 
than ordinary lawyers,115 should be terminated for failing to meet such 
standards.  Part III.C.1 examines the aforementioned case to demonstrate 
how the Illinois State Bar Committee found an applicant to be unfit for the 
practice of law based on the applicant’s expressions of his personal views.  
Part III.C.2 then explains how prosecutors may be terminated for their 
personal expressions due to the unique nature of a prosecutor’s role in 
society. 
1.  Looking to an Individual’s Expressed Bias in Determining 
Character and Fitness for Admission to the Bar 
Matthew Hale sought to be admitted to the Illinois State Bar but was denied 
admission.116  Although he had passed the written examination, the Bar 
Committee found Hale to be “unfit to practice law” due to his history of being 
“a public advocate of white supremacy and the leader of an organization . . . 
dedicated to racism and anti-Semitism.”117  Hale had expressed that his 
 
 111. Bleier, supra note 4 (“I am not going to punish someone for what is clearly political 
speech . . . .”). 
 112. Knowles, supra note 4 (“As a result, he was forced to attend sensitivity training and 
his office created a social media policy, one that he has now violated.”); cf. BARBARA S. 
MAGILL & WORKLAW NETWORK, WORKPLACE PRIVACY:  REAL ANSWERS AND PRACTICAL 
SOLUTIONS 124 (Burton J. Fishman ed., 2d ed. 2007) (“The First Amendment’s prohibition 
against governmental restriction of free speech does not prevent private employers from taking 
disciplinary action against employees based on the content of their [social media postings].”). 
 113. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.2(a) (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 2015); Jackson, supra note 16. 
 114. See, e.g., Hale v. Comm. on Character & Fitness, 335 F.3d 678, 679 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 115. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 116. Hale, 335 F.3d at 679. 
 117. Id.  The Committee also considered Hale’s prior arrests in its evaluation of his 
character and fitness. Id. at 680–81. 
1350 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
“mission in life is to bring about the hegemony of the white race, the legal 
abolition of equal protection, and the deportation of non-white 
Americans.”118  In response, the Committee determined that Hale’s mission 
demonstrated that he had a propensity to act in ways “that were inconsistent 
with membership in the bar,” whose lawyers “have a special responsibility to 
uphold the rule of law for all persons.”119  The Committee found that Hale’s 
“distasteful views” were not protected under the First Amendment for the 
purposes of admission to the bar and further characterized Hale as a bigot 
with a “gross deficiency in moral character” under “any civilized standards 
of decency.”120  Despite testimony from multiple witnesses asserting that 
Hale was fit to practice law as well as Hale’s assertion that he would comply 
with the bar’s standards during the hours he worked as an attorney, Hale was 
denied admission.121 
The First Amendment clearly protects political speech,122 but Hale was 
denied admission to the bar for his dedication to racism and anti-Semitism.123  
On its face, it seems that Illinois’s refusal to admit Hale to the bar was due to 
his political views of white supremacy and anti-Semitism.  The Illinois Bar 
Committee justified its decision “by drawing a distinction between Hale’s 
First Amendment right to express ideas and his right to become a member of 
the Illinois bar.”124  While Hale may be free to express such views under the 
First Amendment, his freedom to do so as a citizen does not require a finding 
that he “possesses the requisite character and fitness . . . for the practice of 
law.”125  At which point, however, does an examination of a candidate’s 
personal views constitute discrimination based on an individual’s political 
views?126 
It seems as if the Committee in Hale, by characterizing Hale as grossly 
immoral and indecent, denied Hale admission because his discriminatory 
views were not simply political preferences but rather evinced animosity 
toward certain groups of people.  However, the exact standard as to “how to 
categorize and assess animus has become a recurring and unresolved question 
in equal protection law.”127  In the situation with ASA Lewis, State Attorney 
 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 680 (emphasis added). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id.  Although Hale had filed petitions all the way to the Supreme Court, the 
Committee’s decision was not overturned. Malika Simmons, Case Note, Hale v. Comm. on 
Character & Fitness, 335 F.3d 678 (7th Cir. 2003), 10 WASH. & LEE RACE & ETHNIC ANC. L.J. 
199, 200 (2004). 
 122. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 143, 
144 (2010). 
 123. Hale, 335 F.3d at 679. 
 124. Id. at 680. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 681 (“Hale’s complaint squarely raised the claim that the Committee had 
violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments when it arbitrarily denied his bar application, 
because it based its decision not on any conduct in which Hale may have engaged, but instead 
solely on its speculation about his likely future conduct and its distaste for his political and 
religious beliefs.” (emphasis added)). 
 127. Nan D. Hunter, Animus Thick and Thin:  The Broader Impact of the Ninth Circuit 
Decision in Perry v. Brown, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 111, 112 (2012). 
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Ashton believed the line between political speech and animus is identified 
based on a person’s actions.128  Justice Scalia described animosity as 
“hat[red] [toward] any human being or class of human beings” but 
distinguished it from “moral disapproval” of such people or their conduct.129  
Still, the First Amendment protects “the speech rights of anarchists, 
syndicalists, communists, civil rights marchers, Maoist flag burners, and 
other marginal, dissident, or unorthodox speakers” in the interest of political 
liberty of the people from the government.130  This protection is the result of 
the Court’s broad construction of the definition of “political.”  Generally, 
political speech concerns “all issues about which information is needed or 
appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of 
their period.”131 
2.  Terminating Prosecutors as Policymakers 
Under Stricter Standards of Loyalty 
What remains consistent in each discussion of the qualifications and 
exceptions to the protections of the First Amendment is the notion of 
“adverse effect” to the government employer or public institution.  Connick 
held that the questionnaire was not protected because it was adverse to the 
office’s functions and did not meaningfully contribute to the public 
discussion.132  Garcetti emphasized that the government may regulate speech 
made pursuant to an employee’s duties because such speech affects the 
office’s functions.133  Pickering held the teacher’s speech to be protected 
because it addressed an unfavorable process in the schools and served to 
improve the education system.134  The Committee in Hale was concerned 
about Hale’s future propensity for discrimination as a member of the bar and 
found that propensity to be adverse to the interests of the bar.135  It follows 
that, when a certain character is required of individuals who seek to become 
prosecutors, a demonstrated lack of such character by a prosecutor should be 
ground for termination when there is an apparent adverse effect on the 
office’s functions by such viewpoints. 
 
 128. Bleier, supra note 4 (“‘I’ve never had a victim come to us and say this man is not 
treating us with respect . . . I am not going to punish someone for what is clearly political 
speech.’” (alteration in original)); Weiner, supra note 4. 
 129. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 644 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 130. Sullivan, supra note 122, at 144.  Still, the Court has limited the scope of political 
speech to exclude fighting words. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 
(1942) (holding that speech may be banned when the words, “by their very utterance[,] inflict 
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace”).  For a further discussion of the 
limitations on free speech, see generally Chip Hutzler, A Paradoxical Approach to the First 
Amendment and Hate-Speech, 4 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 205 (1993). 
 131. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940).  See generally W. Robert Gray, Public 
and Private Speech:  Toward a Practice of Pluralistic Convergence in Free-Speech Values, 1 
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 1 (1994). 
 132. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 (1983). 
 133. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418–19 (2006). 
 134. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968). 
 135. Hale v. Comm. on Character & Fitness, 335 F.3d 678, 681 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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State Attorney Ashton’s determination that ASA Lewis’s speech was 
political because it did not adversely affect his treatment of victims is 
intelligible.136  What Ashton failed to emphasize immediately,137 though, is 
that Lewis’s speech constitutes animus rather than political speech,138 and 
such speech may have an adverse effect on the public perception and trust in 
the effective functioning of the prosecutor’s office.139  However, it is unclear 
whether the First Amendment already precluded such speech from the scope 
of its protections and thereby gave Ashton sufficient ground to terminate 
Lewis. 
Some jurisdictions adopt a bright-line rule that holds prosecutors to a 
stricter standard of loyalty to their employers.140  Under this bright-line rule, 
employers may terminate prosecutors at any time for any political 
differences—whether expressed or merely held—that may undermine an 
employer’s confidence in a prosecutor’s loyalty to the office.141  The 
Supreme Court has also noted that, to terminate a public employee for his or 
her political views, the employer must “demonstrate that party affiliation is 
an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office 
involved.”142 
In Marsilio v. Vigluicci,143 Tommie Jo Marsilio, a county prosecutor, ran 
for election as a county judge.  In preparation for her campaign, she circulated 
a proposed campaign advertisement within her committee that accused her 
opponent of being corrupt.144  Victor Vigluicci, her employer, told Marsilio 
that she would have to either cease the circulation of the advertisement and 
apologize to her political opponent or be terminated from her position as an 
assistant county prosecutor.145  When Marsilio did not comply, Vigluicci 
terminated her, and Marsilio subsequently filed a suit alleging wrongful 
termination on the ground of protected political speech.146 
 
 136. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 137. Fieldstadt, supra note 9 (describing how State Attorney Ashton realized the extremity 
of Lewis’s speech but still “fought calls to fire Lewis” and implemented a social media policy 
instead). 
 138. Kenneth Lewis’s posts demonstrated hatred toward gay people and mothers rather 
than mere moral disapproval of their actions, and his posts did not convey any information 
that would be useful for public debate. See supra notes 127–31 and accompanying text. 
 139. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 419 (“When [public employees] speak out, they can express 
views that contravene governmental policies or impair the proper performance of 
governmental functions.”). 
 140. See, e.g., infra notes 152–56 and accompanying text. 
 141. Simasko v. County of St. Clair, 417 F.3d 559, 563 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he mere fact 
that an employee is affiliated with an opposing political party, however quietly, can cause the 
employer not to trust the employee to implement fully the employer’s practices.”); see also 
Dimmig v. Wahl, 983 F.2d 86 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that a deputy sheriff’s political 
inactivity could hinder his effective performance, thereby permitting his employer to terminate 
him). 
 142. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980). 
 143. 924 F. Supp. 2d 837 (N.D. Ohio 2013). 
 144. Id. at 844 (“The advertisement stated, ‘The “Good Old Boys” Say elect Kevin 
Poland . . . Real People Say Elect Tommie Jo Marsilio . . . She is not a member of the Ravenna 
“Good Old Boys” corruption club.’” (alterations in original)). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 845. 
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The District Court for the Northern District of Ohio held that Marsilio’s 
position as an assistant county prosecutor denied her any First Amendment 
protections for speech related to her political views147 because her position 
was one of policymaking.148  This holding is consistent with First 
Amendment jurisprudence because, although the parties agreed that 
Marsilio’s speech may be protected by the First Amendment for addressing 
a matter of public concern,149 the court found that Marsilio’s “free speech 
interests [did not] outweigh the efficiency interests of her government 
employer.”150  In rendering its decision, the court referenced a line of cases 
in which the Supreme Court emphasized that “a public employer may 
terminate a public employee in a policymaking or confidential position . . . 
because of [the employee’s] political affiliation without violating the First 
Amendment” when such affiliations would hinder the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the office.151  Furthermore, the court held that, because 
 
 147. Branti, 445 U.S. at 515 (noting that the First Amendment typically protects citizens 
from being terminated for personal speech and, therefore, beliefs). 
 148. Id. at 852.  The Sixth Circuit articulated four categories of public employees who are 
to be considered policymaking or confidential employees: 
(1) positions specifically named in relevant law to which discretionary authority in 
carrying out law enforcement or political policy is granted; (2) positions to which a 
significant amount of category-one authority has been delegated, or positions not 
specifically named by law but inherently possessing category-one type authority; (3) 
confidential advisors to category-one position-holders; or (4) positions that are part 
of a group of positions filled by balancing out political party representation or by 
balancing out selections made by different government bodies. 
Id. at 850–51 (citing Silberstein v. Dayton, 440 F.3d 306, 319 (6th Cir. 2006)); see id. 
(describing the Sixth Circuit holding that prosecutors fall within this policymaking or 
confidential-employee exception, therefore allowing the government to terminate prosecutors 
for political speech without violating the First Amendment); see also Latham v. Office of 
Attorney Gen., 395 F.3d 261, 269 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[W]here the inherent duties of the 
employee are broad and limited primarily by the discretion of the policymaker, it is likely that 
the employee is herself a confidential or policymaking employee under Elrod.”); Monks v. 
Marlinga, 923 F.2d 423, 426 (6th Cir. 1991) (“Because Michigan law statutorily imposes the 
inherent policy-making responsibilities of the prosecutor on the assistant prosecutor, we hold 
that the job of assistant prosecutor is a policy-making position.”). 
 149. Marsilio, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 849; see supra Part III.B. 
 150. Marsilio, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 849. 
 151. Id. (citing Rose v. Stephens, 291 F.3d 917, 921 (6th Cir. 2002)); see also Branti v. 
Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 517 (1980) (“Thus, if an employee’s private political beliefs would 
interfere with the discharge of his public duties, his First Amendment rights may be required 
to yield to the State’s vital interest in maintaining governmental effectiveness and efficiency.” 
(citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 366 (1976))).  Circuit courts apply this doctrine in various 
ways.  Many circuits treat the Pickering balancing test as separate from identifying whether a 
public employee has a policymaking position under Elrod and Branti, whereas the Ninth 
Circuit holds that a finding that a public employee has a policymaking position automatically 
precludes any Pickering analysis. Compare Rose, 291 F.3d at 922 (“We adopt an approach 
similar to that of the First, Seventh and Tenth Circuits, and hold that where an employee is in 
a policymaking or confidential position and is terminated for speech related to his political or 
policy views, the Pickering balance favors the government as a matter of law.”), and Lewis v. 
Cowen, 165 F.3d 154, 162 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[A] policymaking employee may be discharged 
on the basis of political affiliation such as membership (or lack of membership) in a particular 
political party . . . [when] the Pickering balancing test favors the government employer.”), 
with Biggs v. Best, Best & Krieger, 189 F.3d 989, 994–95 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[A]n employee’s 
status as a policymaking or confidential employee would be dispositive of any First 
Amendment retaliation claim.”), and Fazio v. City & County of San Francisco, 125 F.3d 1328, 
1354 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
prosecutors need to show loyalty to their employer,152 their political views 
and expressions constitute speech within the scope of their employment.153  
Ultimately, the court held that Marsilio’s political speech was sufficient to 
undermine the employer’s trust in Marsilio’s performance154 and was 
therefore a valid ground for termination.155  This very loose standard allows 
an employer to terminate prosecutors whom the employer believes might be 
disloyal due to their political views or affiliations.156 
Despite this authority granted to employers who perceive disloyalty, the 
question of a prosecutor’s speech affecting the community’s trust in the office 
remains unanswered.  Marsilio, by addressing the issue of loyalty, is 
concerned with working relationships within the office between the employer 
and employee rather than the public’s perception of the employee.157  
Similarly, in ASA Lewis’s situation, State Attorney Ashton expressly stated 
that he felt ASA Lewis was performing perfectly well despite his “offensive 
and dehumanizing” speech and therefore did not initially terminate Lewis for 
his speech.158  Yet, the law does nothing to punish a prosecutor whose 
animosity does not create a concern of loyalty to the chief prosecutor, even 
where such speech might nonetheless destroy the community’s trust in the 
prosecutor and the office. 
 
1334 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Because we hold that [plaintiff’s] position . . . was a policymaking one, 
we do not address [plaintiff’s] claim that under the Pickering balancing test his interest in free 
speech outweighs the [employer’s] interest in running an efficient office.”). 
 152. This duty of loyalty stems from the notion that assistant prosecuting attorneys are 
statutory agents of the elected prosecutor who are authorized to act on behalf of the elected 
prosecutor. Marsilio, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 851–52. 
 153. Id. at 853–54. 
 154. Simasko v. County of St. Clair, 417 F.3d 559, 563 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he mere fact 
that an employee is affiliated with an opposing political party, however quietly, can cause the 
employer not to trust the employee to implement fully the employer’s practices.”); Latham v. 
Office of Attorney Gen., 395 F.3d 261, 267 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that, when a confidential 
or policymaking employee’s speech might cause the employer to be unable to trust the 
employee to implement the employer’s policies fully, his “conduct in speaking out against the 
central enforcement policies of [the] department . . . [is] sufficiently insubordinate to 
overcome any First Amendment bar to [his] termination”). 
 155. Marsilio, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 853–54; see also Rose, 291 F.3d at 923 (“In other words, 
the government’s interest in appointing politically loyal employees to certain positions 
converges with its interest in operating an efficient workplace when dealing with 
policymaking employees because loyalty by those employees is an essential requirement for 
the efficient functioning of the workplace.”). 
 156. Marsilio, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 854 (“The determination for the Court, therefore, is . . . 
whether [the employee’s] speech could lead the employer not to trust the employee to loyally 
implement the employer’s practices.” (first emphasis added)). 
 157. See id. at 852. 
 158. Bleier, supra note 4 (“Despite calling his subordinate’s remarks ‘offensive and 
dehumanizing,’ State Attorney Jeff Ashton said Lewis will not be reprimanded.”). 
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IV.  THE NEED FOR LIMITED FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION 
OF PROSECUTORIAL SPEECH THAT HAS 
NO ADVERSE IMPACT ON PERFORMANCE 
Prosecutors are citizens and deserve some First Amendment 
protections.159  The law is clear that the First Amendment does not protect a 
prosecutor’s speech that directly interferes with the office’s functions.160  
Some circuits even allow prosecutors to be terminated for political speech if 
the chief prosecutor believes the subordinate may be disloyal.161  However, 
it is evident that this method of holding prosecutors accountable for their 
speech is insufficient and inadequate to protect the People’s interest in being 
adequately represented by prosecutors in criminal proceedings.162 
A prosecutor’s duty is to serve the public163 and to uphold the public 
interest.164  Although the chief prosecutor has the authority to determine what 
the public interest is,165 the chief prosecutor, like every other prosecutor in 
the office, is also obligated to serve the public.166  Therefore, in a broader 
sense, the employer of any given prosecutor is the community that the 
prosecutor serves.167  Under this view, a prosecutor should be terminated not 
only when he or she undermines the office’s functions or the chief 
prosecutor’s trust but also when the prosecutor undermines the community’s 
trust.  Part IV.A consolidates the principles surrounding prosecutorial speech 
and proposes that the public may be considered an employer of all 
prosecutors and should therefore also have a means of terminating a 
prosecutor who undermines the community’s trust.  Part IV.B then discusses 
some outstanding considerations of the proposed standard and concludes 
with an illustration of how the new standard fits within the story of ASA 
Lewis’s termination. 
A.  Community Trust as Another Standard 
for Permissible Prosecutorial Speech 
Even if the chief prosecutor does not terminate a prosecutor for 
problematic speech, the People should be able to terminate the prosecutor as 
his or her employer when it has reason to believe that the prosecutor cannot 
 
 159. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 160. See supra Part III.A. 
 161. See supra notes 140–56 and accompanying text. 
 162. See Fieldstadt, supra note 9 (“Ashton pointed out that he fought calls to fire Lewis in 
2014 . . . .”). 
 163. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.3 (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 2015). 
 164. Id. § 3-1.2(b). 
 165. Id. § 3-1.3 (“The public’s interests and views . . . should be determined by the chief 
prosecutor and designated assistants in the jurisdiction.”). 
 166. Id. §§ 3-1.1(a), 3-1.2(b).  The standards note that the role of any prosecutor, 
“regardless of . . . title,” id. § 3-1.1(a), is to “serve[] the public interest,” id. § 3-1.2(b). 
 167. Cf. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (“[T]he State has interests as 
an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it 
possesses . . . .” (emphases added)). 
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effectively serve his or her function of pursuing the community’s interest.168  
In determining the extent of the First Amendment’s protections for 
prosecutorial speech that undermines community trust, it is important to note 
that an overly strict approach, such as the bright-line rule that some 
jurisdictions have adopted,169 entails a risk of hindering the public’s already 
minimal insight into prosecutorial discretion.170  Drastically limiting 
protections for problematic prosecutorial speech could deter prosecutors 
from communicating with the public in fear of expressing their biases and 
thereby further shroud the considerations prosecutors make in exercising 
discretion.  What follows is that the lack of First Amendment protections 
could function as yet another veil that blinds the public from the internal 
process of prosecutorial discretion.171  Excessively limiting the protections 
for prosecutors could also deter even passionate and motivated attorneys 
from becoming prosecutors.  Therefore, giving the public too much 
transparency into prosecutors’ work could hinder the efficiency of the 
prosecutorial office as such transparency may lead to frequent public outcries 
for the removal of every prosecutor who expresses any unpopular 
opinions.172 
Furthermore, although some circuits adopt a bright-line rule allowing the 
chief prosecutor to fire a prosecutor for holding or expressing different 
political views,173 it would be impractical to give the People the same level 
of authority over firing prosecutors.  Nonetheless, these circuits are correct 
to have strict limitations on prosecutorial speech because prosecutors are the 
only representatives of the People who, in turn, should be able to trust their 
prosecutors to represent the interests of the community. 
 
 168. The ABA also recognizes a need for the regulation of prosecutorial conduct and notes 
that reports of prosecutorial misconduct that occur should be addressed. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.7(j).  But see H. Mitchell Caldwell, The 
Prosecutor Prince:  Misconduct, Accountability, and a Modest Proposal, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 
51, 55 (2013) (noting that disciplinary actions are grossly inadequate for prosecutors despite 
the need for more severe accountability of prosecutors); Angela J. Davis, The Legal 
Profession’s Failure to Discipline Unethical Prosecutors, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 275, 277 
(2007) (noting that disciplinary processes have not actually disciplined prosecutors abusing 
their power and discretion); David Keenan et al., The Myth of Prosecutorial Accountability 
After Connick v. Thompson:  Why Existing Professional Responsibility Measures Cannot 
Protect Against Prosecutorial Misconduct, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 203, 203–04 (2011) 
(explaining how current professional responsibility measures do not adequately police 
prosecutorial misconduct).  The ABA standard as well as these articles that discuss 
prosecutorial misconduct are concerned with prosecutorial misconduct that directly violates 
rules of professional conduct.  This Note, however, proposes to expand the scope of such 
regulation to focus not only on prosecutorial misconduct as defined by the ABA but also on 
prosecutorial speech that undermines the community’s trust in and the integrity of the criminal 
justice system as a whole. 
 169. See supra notes 140–56 and accompanying text. 
 170. See supra note 37. 
 171. See Green & Roiphe, supra note 46, at 467 (“[P]rosecutors should be more deliberate 
and transparent in how they execute decisions.”). 
 172. See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text; see also CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.7(j) (recognizing that frivolous complaints 
of prosecutorial misconduct exist but can be dismissed). 
 173. See supra note 151. 
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As a result, although it is helpful to adopt the bright-line approach to allow 
an employer to terminate a prosecutor for a lack of loyalty, the employer’s 
authority should be more constrained to avoid violating prosecutors’ 
constitutional rights while also ensuring that the prosecutors’ offices have 
enough flexibility to function effectively.  Rather than allowing the People to 
terminate a prosecutor for any possible breach of loyalty, the People should 
be able to terminate a prosecutor only when there is a significant pushback 
on a prosecutor’s reliability in representing the People’s interests.174  The 
foregoing discussion of the First Amendment’s protection of speech 
repeatedly mentions the notion of “adverse effects.”175  Thus, it is reasonable 
to require some form of adverse effect on the community’s trust in the 
criminal justice system as a baseline standard in evaluating prosecutorial 
speech.  If the community’s trust in the criminal justice system is 
substantially and negatively affected by the prosecutor’s speech, that form of 
speech should be considered a valid ground for termination. 
Because this Note proposes that prosecutors should be terminated for 
expressing animosity even before the prosecutor acts according to any such 
bias, requiring proof of adverse effect on performance would be difficult.176  
This Note’s proposal requires only an adverse effect on the community’s 
trust.  In determining the standard of proof the public must satisfy to 
terminate a prosecutor, the court’s analysis in Hale is instructive.177  If the 
public can demonstrate to the disciplinary committee that a prosecutor’s 
speech evidences a “gross deficiency in moral character” under “any civilized 
standards of decency,”178 the disciplinary committee should reevaluate 
whether the prosecutor “possesse[s] the requisite character and fitness” to 
serve as a prosecutor.179  This Note proposes a relatively high standard of 
“gross deficiency” because prosecutors must have some standard that bars 
nonmeritorious or frivolous complaints from being brought by the People to 
ensure that the functionality and efficiency of the prosecutorial office is not 
unnecessarily compromised.180 
 
 174. Just as ASA Lewis was fired for his comments on a case to which he was not assigned, 
the People should be able to file complaints about a prosecutor’s general lack of reliability as 
a representative of the People in a criminal trial.  This Note does not address claims of 
prosecutorial misconduct in specific cases but is concerned about a prosecutor’s character and 
fitness in serving the People’s interest. 
 175. See supra notes 132–35 and accompanying text. 
 176. See supra notes 132–35 and accompanying text.  Although adverse effects on 
performance may provide corroborating evidence that the public has reason to distrust a 
prosecutor for his or her bias, such evidence would be more aligned with civil claims of 
prosecutorial misconduct rather than the issue of trust with which this Note is concerned. 
 177. See supra notes 116–21 and accompanying text. 
 178. Hale v. Comm. on Character & Fitness, 335 F.3d 678, 680 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 179. Id.; see also Jackson, supra note 16 (“[Prosecutors] are thus required to win an 
expression of confidence in [their] character by both the legislative and the executive branches 
of the government before assuming the responsibilities of a . . . prosecutor.”). 
 180. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
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B.  Considerations and Illustration of the Proposed Standard 
The implementation of this standard may, admittedly, be difficult for a few 
reasons.  First, different people hold different views and may lose trust in a 
prosecutor for different reasons.  Second, neither the victim nor any other 
member of the general public is directly represented by prosecutors in the 
criminal justice system,181 but it will still be difficult to completely disregard 
the emotions of the individuals who allege misconduct or improper biases, 
especially if those allegations arise in response to a prosecutor’s conduct or 
speech in investigating or trying a case.  Nonetheless, in an effort to pursue 
justice, prosecutors are expected to “consider the interests of victims and 
witnesses[] and respect the constitutional and legal rights of all persons, 
including suspects and defendants.”182  Following this expectation, allowing 
any informed member of the public—such as potential victims, witnesses, 
suspects, or defendants—to file complaints about a prosecutor’s bias would 
enable the People to remove the prosecutor from office and thereby prevent 
a prosecutor whose biases contravene the community’s interest from 
representing the People in a criminal case. 
Because this proposed standard involves a breach of the community’s trust, 
unpublicized prosecutorial speech cannot be ground for termination.  
Whereas a chief prosecutor may terminate a subordinate prosecutor even for 
unpublicized speech when the speech undermines either the office’s 
functions183 or the employer’s confidence in the prosecutor’s loyalty,184 it is 
impossible for the People to complain about speech that was never 
publicized.  If the People are not aware of the speech and the chief prosecutor 
does not feel a need to terminate the subordinate prosecutor for a lack of 
loyalty,185 there is no reason for the prosecutor to be terminated because the 
 
 181. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2015) (“The prosecutor generally serves the public and not any particular . . . witness or 
victim.”).  Because victims have no right in the criminal justice process, the criminal justice 
system is not concerned with whether the victims get justice but rather whether the integrity 
of the system is sufficiently preserved to grant justice to society at large. See Mikhail v. Kahn, 
991 F. Supp. 2d 596, 637 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (“[E]ven when individuals are wronged in a manner 
cognizable under criminal law, they ‘do not have a constitutional right to the prosecution of 
alleged criminals.’” (quoting Capogrosso v. Supreme Court, 588 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(per curiam))). 
 182. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.2(b). 
 183. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 151 (1983); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 
(1974). 
 184. See supra notes 152–56 and accompanying text. 
 185. Latham v. Office of Attorney Gen., 395 F.3d 261, 266 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Furthermore, 
in Rose, we focused on how the speech would affect the employer’s ability to maintain a 
working relationship with his or her employees, rather than whether the speech was ‘public’ 
or ‘intra-office.’” (emphasis added)); Rose v. Stephens, 291 F.3d 917, 923 (6th Cir. 2002) 
(“When such an employee speaks in a manner that undermines the trust and confidence that 
are central to his position, the balance definitively tips in the government’s favor because an 
overt act of disloyalty necessarily causes significant disruption in the working relationship 
between a confidential employee and his superiors.” (emphasis added)). 
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prosecutor did nothing to adversely impact the community’s trust in the office 
and its functions.186 
This proposed standard strives to maximize the protection of a prosecutor’s 
First Amendment rights insofar as the public’s interest in regulating its 
prosecutors is satisfied.  Illustrating the application of this standard with ASA 
Lewis’s situation demonstrates how and why Lewis should justifiably be 
terminated for his speech.  Lewis claims that his derogatory comment 
towards mothers was “only meant for his inner circle of friends” despite his 
posting the statement on Facebook.187  Under the proposed standard, the 
public would be able to remove Lewis from office for holding and expressing 
such views publicly.  Besides, a prosecutor who expects a public Facebook 
post to be contained within his private sphere arguably meets a reasonable 
standard of untrustworthiness, and private speech that becomes publicized 
through such carelessness justifiably warrants a complaint from the public 
that questions the trustworthiness of the prosecutor.  Furthermore, even if the 
chief prosecutor believes the biased prosecutor could exercise his duties in a 
professional manner,188 this proposed standard affords the public an 
opportunity to remove a prosecutor who publicly expresses blatant animosity 
toward the community he has sworn to serve. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the ethical rules governing prosecutorial conduct and the 
constitutional authority granted to chief prosecutors in terminating 
subordinate prosecutors for problematic speech under the First Amendment, 
current measures of regulating problematic prosecutorial speech are still, 
evidently, ineffective.  To maintain the community’s trust that the interests 
of the People will be adequately represented in the criminal justice system, 
prosecutors should be held accountable for speech that undermines such trust.  
Giving some power to the People—who are the employers of every 
prosecutor in the community under a broader, and arguably more technical, 
view—in terminating prosecutors who express problematic speech helps 
mitigate the extent to which community trust is undermined by prosecutors 
who do not demonstrate the requisite character to represent the interests of 
the People zealously.  Setting community trust as the core standard in 
evaluating prosecutorial speech as it pertains to the community’s trust in the 
criminal justice system allows prosecutors to enjoy the greatest extent of the 
constitutional protections afforded to them under the First Amendment while 
also subjecting them to the practical expectations of professional 
responsibility expected of the People’s attorney—the prosecutor. 
 
 186. The intention of this Note’s proposed standard is not to replace the current method of 
employers holding prosecutors accountable for their speech but rather to add another method 
by which the People can hold prosecutors accountable for their speech. 
 187. Paschall-Brown, supra note 3. 
 188. Bleier, supra note 4 (“‘I’ve never had a victim come to us and say this man is not 
treating us with respect . . . . ,’ Ashton said.”). 
